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‘Fourteen Jailed’: Politics and Justice 
in Vanuatu
On 9 October 2015, 14 members of the Vanuatu 
parliament (out of 52) were sentenced to between 
three and four years jail for the crimes of corruption 
and bribery of officials (Public Prosecutor v Kalosil 
[2015] VUSC 149). Five were ministers, two others 
held Cabinet rank, and all formed part of the 
government. This In Brief summarises the three 
main judgments concerned and their implications 
for the separation of powers and operation of the 
judicial system in Vanuatu. The still-unfolding 
political context of these events will be the subject 
of later In Briefs.
The origins of the prosecutions date to 
November 2014 when the Opposition tabled a 
motion of no confidence, leading to the ousting of 
prime minister Joe Natuman. It brought to power 
the government of Sato Kilman, with Moana 
Carcasses as deputy prime minister. Motions of 
no confidence are extremely common in Vanuatu, 
but this motion was alleged to have been paid 
for by bribes of VT1,000,000 (AU$12,678) from 
Carcasses to 15 other MPs in late 2014. A criminal 
investigation was initiated by a complaint by former 
prime minister Natuman. Unlike other similar 
investigations that were diverted along the way, 
in this case a critical mass of judicial, political 
and public support appears to have dissuaded any 
attempt to derail the process.
In August 2015, 16 government MPs were 
therefore charged with offences under both the 
Penal Code Act and also Bribery and Acceptance 
of Loans under the Leadership Code Act (LCA). 
One MP (veteran Finance Minister Willie Jimmy) 
pleaded guilty, and the 15 others were tried in a 
trial commencing 7 September. A person convicted 
under the LCA can be dismissed from office 
and disqualified from standing for election for 
10 years. In contrast, convicted MPs only cease 
being members of parliament for offences under 
the Penal Code if sentenced to more than two years 
imprisonment. The LCA requires the ombudsman 
to conduct an investigation and then, if he or she 
considers that the Act has been breached, to send 
a copy of the report of the investigation to the 
public prosecutor and to the police if the complaint 
involves criminal misconduct.
The charges under the LCA were challenged by 
the defendants in a constitutional petition. They 
claimed the constitution requires those under 
investigation be given an opportunity to reply to 
adverse findings before the ombudsman’s report is 
sent to the public prosecutor. That did not occur 
in this case. The ombudsman contended that the 
constitutional right was satisfied by the defendants’ 
rights to respond to the allegations during the 
prosecution or court hearing. The day before the 
main trial, Justice Fatiaki found that the defendants’ 
rights had been infringed and therefore declared 
the ombudsman’s special preliminary report invalid 
(Nari v Republic of Vanuatu [2015] VUSC 132). 
This continues a tradition of under-use of the LCA 
to prosecute leaders in Vanuatu (Forsyth 2003).
At the main trial the next day, Justice Sey 
decided not to proceed with the charges under the 
LCA on the basis of Justice Fatiaki’s findings. All the 
defendants except one, Robert Bohn, elected not to 
give evidence in their defence, and all except him 
were convicted. Evidence was given by a number 
of prosecution witnesses that as MPs they had 
been approached by either Moana Carcasses or his 
associate and offered bribes to support the motion 
of no confidence against the government. The other 
compelling evidence was bank account details of 
the payments to the MPs made by Carcasses. These 
payments were ostensibly for the MPs to ‘develop 
further their communities’ but the judge found 
that they were in fact corrupt payments made to 
influence the MPs to vote in favour of the motion 
of no confidence (Public Prosecutor v Kalosil [2015] 
VUSC 135).
However, the fight was not yet over. The day 
following their conviction, one of the convicted 
politicians, the speaker of parliament, then acting 
president, purported to use the presidential powers 
of pardon under the constitution to pardon himself 
and the 13 other politicians found guilty, claiming 
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it was in the interests of maintaining peace and 
unity in Vanuatu. The president arrived back 
in Vanuatu the next day, and several days later 
revoked the pardon. The day before this revocation, 
the Opposition leader and several others sought 
a declaration in the Supreme Court that the 
instrument of pardon was unconstitutional. The day 
of the revocation, the speaker and others also filed 
a constitutional application, seeking an order that 
the revocation be declared unconstitutional. Justice 
Saksak heard both cases together and on 21 October 
held in favour of the first applicants, finding that the 
purported pardon was unconstitutional (Natuman 
v President of the Republic of Vanuatu; Vohor v 
President of the Republic of Vanuatu [2015] VUSC 
148). His Honour held the powers of pardon must 
be used in a principled, transparent and consistent 
way, meaning there should have been some advice 
and/or consultation before its exercise. In addition, 
the pardon involved a conflict of interest and 
demeaned the office of president and therefore was 
in breach of art. 66 of the constitution.
On 22 October, Justice Sey delivered her 
sentence for the bribery convictions, imposing 
periods of between three and four years 
imprisonment on all the defendants except MP 
Jimmy, who was given a suspended sentence. Her 
Honour stressed that ‘unsavory acts of corruption 
and bribery need to be weeded out in Vanuatu’ 
and that the sentence of imprisonment was 
both to punish and ‘to deter other like-minded 
leaders in positions of authority from committing 
similar offences’.
Subsequently, 6 of the 14 convicted MPs 
appealed to the Court of Appeal (CA) and an 
appeal was also made against the pardoning 
decision. All the appeals were dismissed on 
20 November, although the CA’s findings differed 
in certain respects from the reasoning of the court 
below. The CA held that Justice Fatiaki had been 
incorrect in holding the ombudsman’s enquiry was 
a prerequisite to the laying of a charge under the 
LCA, an important clarification for future cases. In 
the event, however, these charges were dismissed 
by consent. In relation to the presidential pardon, 
the CA also clarified that the speaker had had the 
power to grant the pardon and that the power to 
pardon could be exercised before sentence. However, 
their honours agreed that granting the pardon in the 
circumstances breached s. 66 of the constitution.
Overall, this episode demonstrates the continued 
reliance by the politicians on the court as the final 
arbiter on issues of political import (Forsyth 2015). 
In fact, a constant stream of related cases have 
recently been brought before the courts. Apart 
from one report of an attempt to deport Justice Sey, 
there have not been any public statements seeking 
to undermine the authority or role of the court 
system, even by those convicted. Quite the contrary, 
there has been considerable praise for the courts 
and for Justice Sey, a female expatriate judge. The 
public also demonstrated a preparedness to allow 
the courts to implement the law, with no civil unrest 
following the decisions despite the huge interest 
evidenced by overflowing crowds at the courthouse. 
The Supreme Court’s policy of publicly reading 
their judgments aloud and making them almost 
immediately available online possibly contributed to 
this by adding transparency and awareness-raising.
The judicial system has played a critical part 
in providing a strong framework to manage 
these complex issues of governance and politics 
in a peaceful manner. Also of importance was 
the coalescence of strong moral authority from 
a number of different sources, particularly the 
president in his public addresses; the National 
Council of Chiefs, who have made several strong 
statements about the need for calm and respect 
for the law; and the Vanuatu Christian Council. 
Overall, although there are still many questions 
about the possibility of ending the abuses of power 
documented in these recent cases, it has been shown 
that the Vanuatu judiciary can be relied upon to 
provide an element of stability and accountability.
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